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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
W. B. RUSSELL,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.

Case No.
7647

THE OGDEN UNION RAILWAY
AND DEPOT COMPANY, a corporation,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF FACTS
PRELIMINARY STAT'EMENT
The parties will be referred to as in the court below.
The italics are ours.
In making up the record on appeal the Clerk of the
District Court used a stamp on the judgment roll numbering
the pages from 1 to 73, inclusive, but did not number the
reporter's transcript of the proceedings had at the trial
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and the transcript bears the reporter's numbers, pages 1
to 54, inclusive. We will therefore refer to the reporter's
transcript of the proceedings. had at the trial as (Tr. -)
and other portions of the record as ( R. -) .
This case was tried before the Hon. Charles G. Cowley,
Judge of the District Court of Weber County, sitting without a jury, and resulted in a money judgment in favor of
the plaintiff and against the defendant in the sum of $18,892.76, together with costs of suit.
The pleadings in this~ case appear voluminous owing to
the fact that a number of appearances were made before the
court prior to trial, which involved hearings on demurrers,
various motions, applications for amendment, etc. by both
plaintiff and defendant. The issues, however, at the time
of the trial were quite simple and in order to be of as much
assistance to the court as. possible we will endeavor to keep
this statement of facts confined to those matters relating to
the issues litigated by the parties at the trial and which
are pertinent to this appeal. The plaintiff presented the
entire facts of his. case to the court in a few minutes, owing
largely to stipulations entered into and admissions made
by the defendant. Plaintiff did not testify and he called no
witnesses. Therefore, in the first place, we think we should
set forth those facts which were either admitted in the
pleadings or stipulated to by the parties at the trial.
The corporate existence of the defendant was admitted
and it was admitted that the plaintiff on August 3, 1945
was, and had since August 18, 1941, been employed by the
defendant as. a switchman at its terminal yards at Ogden,
Utah; that there had been in existence since October 1, 1942,
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3
and during all the time of plaintiff's employment, a collective bargaining agreement between the defendant carrier
and the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen covering wages,
working conditions, procedure for discipline, and all such
other details usually covered in agreements of this type.
The agreement covered all "yardmen" employed by the
defendant within the limits of the yards at Ogden, and the
defendant admitted and now admits that whatever the
duties of employes were, who were classified as yardmen
working within the Ogden Yard, they were entitled to all
the benefits of this contract (Plaintiff's Ex. "E"), whether
they belonged to the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen,
The Switchmen's Union of North America, some other
union, or were members of no union at all. It was undisputed that the plaintiff was a member of the Switchman's
Union of North America, performed all of his duties within
the limits of the Ogden Yard, was classified as a yardman
within the contemplation of the agreement referred to, entitled to the benefits thereof, and subject to its, burdens ..
On August 3, 1945, pursuant to notice, the plaintiff appeared, with the Local Chairman of the Switchmen's Union
of North America as his representative, before the Assistant
Superintendent of the defendant company to answer a
charge of violating the terms of the collective bargaining
agreement governing his employment; specifically, for
having been absent from duty for a period in excess of ten
days without having secured and filled out "Form 153" as
provided for in Article XIII, Section 55 (b) , of the collective bargaining agreement (Plaintiff's Exhibit "E"). The
testimony was stenographically reported (Plaintiff's Ex.
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"A") , and as the examiner found that the plaintiff was
guilty of the charge, the plaintiff was dismissed from the
service of the defendant company on August 4, 1945. No
issue was made and no evidence was offered at the trial
by the plaintiff in support of any claim that the defendant
company had failed to follow the agreement in giving the
plaintiff proper notice of the time and place of hearing,
opportunity to prepare any defense he cared to, or that he
was denied the right to a representative of his own choos·
ing, or full opportunity to be heard in person or to
have witnes'Ses to testify in his behalf, or to present
any other evidence he desired. The only claim plaintiff made
at the trial in support of his alleged right to recover was
that he was not given a "fair and impartial hearing" and
was dismissed without "just cause," and that the defend·
ant therefore was guilty of a breach of the collective bargaining agreement in dismissing him from service.
The plaintiff in his complaint demanded that the
court award him damages for "all time lost," asking pay
for every single day, that is, 365 days a year, from the date
of plaintiff's discharge August 4, 1945, to the date of trial
September 7, 1950 (Complaint R. 4; Amendment to Complaint R. 43) . He also asked the court to order the defendant to reinstate him in his former employment without any
impairment of his seniority rights. The trial court, it appears, decided the case entirely .upon the written transcript
of the hearing before the defe·ndant's Assistant Superintendent, and. on that alone, and entered judgment for the
full amount prayed for, $18,892.76, but did not direct the
defendant to reinstate plaintiff in his employment.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5
The defendant in its answer (R. 5) and in its amendment to its answer (R. 14), denied that it had dismissed
the plaintiff without sufficient cause and justification and
denied the charge that the plaintiff's conduct failed to
show a violation of the collective bargaining agreement
under which he \Vas employed and alleged affirmatively
that the conduct of the plaintiff was in violation of said
agreement and that the dismissal was justified. The court
admitted the transcript of the investigation, considered it
as substantive evidence and conclusive, although the witnesses are not sworn at such investigations, and refused to·
hear any evidence offered by defendant to show it was
justified in dismissing the plaintiff.
The defendant also denied that the plaintiff had been
damaged in any sum by reason of the matters charged in
the complaint and in addition thereto set forth the following
affirmative matters :
FIRST: That any damages plaintiff might have
suffered could have been mitigated by the plaintiff
and averted or avoided, in whole or in part, by
plaintiff securing remunerative employment after
his dismissal, other than employment by the defendant (R. 6).
SECOND: That the plaintiff was not entitled
to reinstatement or to recover damages for the reason that he had not, following his dismissal, complied
with ArticlE VIII, Rule 38, of the agreement covering the procedure upon application for reinstatement (the detail of which will be covered hereinafter), and that the defendant was powerless to reinstate the plaintiff at any time after his dismissal
without violating the agreement as to· all of its other
employes ( R. 14) .
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THIRD: That the plaintiff failed to object to
his dismissal until the 14th day of January, 1946,
and that therefore, in any event, he would not be
entitled to recover any lost time or damages between
the date of his dismissal and the 24th day of January, 1946, account Article VIII, Rule 38, of the
agreement providing that objection to dismissal
must be filed "not later than thirty days from the
date of dismissal ; otherwise, pay for lost time will
commence ten days after date of letter of objection."
(R. 15, and the agreement, Plaintiff's Ex. "A".)
(The court respected this. provision of the contract
and did not give plaintiff "lost time" for this period,
so it is not discussed hereafter.)
FOURTH: The defendant pleaded that the plaintiff had, through a representative of the Switchmen's Union of North America, whom he had appointed as his representative to handle his grievance
with the defendant, confessed that his testimony
given at the hearing was false, advised the defendant that his claim was withdrawn and advis1ed the defendant that it might consider the case "closed," and
that the defendant company ever since receiving
such advice on May 14, 1946 had treated the matter
as closed and terminated and that by reason thereof
plaintiff had no rights under said agreement, or
otherwise, which he could assert against the defendant company for back wages or reinstatement, and
if any su·ch right ever d id exist plaintiff was
estopped to assert the same (R. 15, 16).
1

The plaintiff's. case having been presented to the court
almost entirely on defendant's admissions in the pleadings
and stipulations entered into at the trial, we do not anticipate that counsel for the plaintiff can take any serious exception to our statement thus far.
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In connection with the first affirmative defense the
undisputed evidence was that the plaintiff earned between
the date of his dismissal and the date of trial in outside
employment the sum of $7,774.39. The trial court refused
to take this into consideration in mitigation of damages.
''rith respect to the second affirmative defense, Article
VIII, Rule 38, of the agreement under which plaintiff was
employed (Plaintiff's Ex. "E") provides in part as follows:
"In case dismissal is found to be unjust, yardmen shall be reinstated and paid for all time lost,
provided, objection has been filed with the Superintendent in writing not later than thirty days from
date of dismissal, otherwise, pay for time lost will
commence ten days after date of letter of objection.
"Reinstatement will not be permitted after the
expiration of six months from date of dismissal, unless agreeable to the management and the general
committee, except that a case pending with either the
BRT or ORC at the expiration of the six-month
period will not be prejudiced. Where the yardman
involved has been out of service six months or less
it will not be obligatory to consult the committees
representing these classes of employes in considering the case for reinstatement."
The plaintiff did nothing about seeking reconsideration
or reinstatement until the lapse of nearly five and a half
months, at which time, that is, January 14, 1946, J. B.
Hudgens, Local Chairman of the Switchmen's Union of
North America, wrote to Mr. R. E. Edens, defendant's
Superintendent at Ogden, asking him to reconsider the decision and reinstate Mr. Russell in his employment (Plaintiff's Ex. "B"). On January 22, 1946, Mr. R. E. Edens,
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the Superintendent, advised Mr. Hudgens that this application for reinstatement of Russell was denied. The Switchmen's Union of North America was authorized in writing
by Mr. W. B. Russell to represent him and attached to Mr.
Hudgen's letter to Mr. Edens is such written authorization,
which at the trial was. not disputed (Tr. 4). At the expiration of the six-month period following dismissal there was
nothing pending with either the BRT· or ORC and the defendant in connection with this case.
Mr. H. C. Beckett, who was and for 15 years had been,
the Local Chairman of the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen in the Ogden Yards, testified that the BRT was the
sole and exclusive bargaining agent for the yardmen in the
Ogden Yards (Tr. 44, 45); that Mr. Russell, in person or
by or through anyone else, never at any time requested or
solicited the BRT in the Ogden Yards to petition for his
reinstatement. Mr. Edens testified that he never at any
time following the dismissal received an application or petition from either the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen or
the Order of Railroad Conductors during the six-month
period or thereafter for reinstatement or reconsideration
of the plaintiff's dismissal (Tr. 41, 42).
We then sought to prove that the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen had never been, at any time, agreeable to
the reinstatement of Mr. Russell, and although Mr. Beckett
so testified, his answers were stricken (Tr. 46). As there
was not pending from the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen or the ORC (Mr. Edens' testimony Tr. 41, 42), or
from anyone else an application for reinstatement at the
expiration of the six..month period following dismissal, it
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was necessary to show that it was not agreeable to the
"General Committee" of the BofRT to reinstate the plaintiff. Two things were necessary to support this affirmative defense, first, that at the expiration of the six-month
period following dismissal there was no application for reinstatement of the plaintiff pending with the management
from either the BofRT or the ORC; and second, to show
that the General Committee was never agreeable at any
time after the six-month period had expired to the plaintiff's reinstatement. The court permitted us to prove
through Mr. Edens' testimony referred to above and appearing at Tr. 41, 42, that at no time did the Brotherhood
of Railroad Trainmen or the ORC have pending with the
management an application for reinstatement of the plaintiff, but refused to permit us to prove that the "General
Committee" was unwilling to consent to the plaintiff's reinstatement after the six-month period from date of dismissal had expired. We were prepared to show that the
"General Committee" as used in the agreement meant the
General Committee of the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, and that the ORC was not involved or required to give
its consent after the expiration of six months to reinstatement, but in view of the fact that the· .testimony of Mr.
Beckett, the Local Chairman of the BofRT, that the BofRT
was not agreeable to the reinstatement (Tr. 46) was
promptly stricken, we think we were justified in not offending against the court's ruling by pursuing the matter further. With no application for reinstatement pending from
either the BofRT or ORC, and the BofRT being unwilling
to consent to reinstatement after the six-month period, the
defendant, had it so desired, could not have reinstated the
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plaintiff without breaching the agreement with every employe in the Ogden Yard who would be set down one place
on the seniority roster because of plaintiff's reinstatement.
We apologize for interjecting in this "statement of facts"
the foregoing explanatory matter, but it seemed necessary
in order to establish the significance of this affirmative
defense.
With respect to the third affirmative defense, the
court respected the contract and did not allow "lost time"
as damages between the date of dismissal and ten days after
receipt of plaintiff's application for reinstatement.
With respect to the fourth affirmative defense, the
defendant introduced a letter from Mr. C. E. McDaniels,
Acting Vice President of the Switchmen's Union of North
America, dated F·ebruary 15, 1946, addres~sed to Mr. F. C.
Paulsen, Vice President of the defendant company (Plaintiff's Ex. "D"), to which was attached the written authorization of the plaintiff authorizing the Switchmen's Union
of North Ame-rica to represent him, and in which reconsideration and reinstatement was requested by the plaintiff.
Defendant also introduced a letter written by Mr. McDaniels May 14, 1946 to Mr. F. C. Paulsen (Defendant's
Ex. "3"), in which he refers to an agreement reached between himself and Mr. Paulsen wherein he undertook to
investigate "undesirable procedure on the part of Mr.
Russell resulting in false testimony evidenced during formal
investigation of August 3, 1945." He then states. in the
last paragraph of his letter that their investigation of the
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alleged false testimony of Mr. Russell has been completed
and that, and we quote, "we are withdrawing the grievance
and the case h~ closed."
Mr. R. E. Edens, Superintendent of the defendant company, was sworn and testified that Mr. McDaniels' last
letter (defendant's Ex. "3") was given to him by Mr.
Paulsen, to whom it was addressed, and that ever since said
date the defendant company had considered· the matter
a closed issue (Tr. 42, 43) .
The original fully executed contract between the defendant and BofRT was introduced in evidence and it was
stipulated that plaintiff's Exhibit "E", a true copy, might
be substituted therefor (Tr. 44).

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING
THE TRANSCRIPT OF THE PROCEEDINGS
AT THE OFFICIAL INVESTIGATION AS SUBSTANTIVE EVIDENCE OF THE FACTS
THEREIN STATED.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN REFUSING T·O GRANT THE
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A JUDGMENT
OF NONSUIT.
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POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN LIMITING
THE EVIDENCE ON THE QUESTION OF
WHETHER OR NOT DEFENDANT HAD
BREACHED THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT SOLELY· UPON THE
TRANSCRIPT OF THE UNSWORN TESTIMONY GIVEN AT THE. OFFICIAL INVESTIGATION; IN REFUSING TO ADMIT EVIDENCE PROFFERED BY THE DEFENDANT
TO SHOW JUSTIFICATION FOR .PLAINTIFF'S
DISMISSAL; AND IN REFUSING TO PERMIT
THE DEFENDANT TO PROVE THAT PLAINTIFF'S T·ESTIMONY CONTAINED IN SAID
TRANS·CRIPT WAS FALSE.
POINT IV.
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN ASSESSING AND FIXING
·DAMAGES:
IN REFUSING TO ALLOW AS MITIGATION OF DAMAGES THE AMOUNT OF
MONEY EARNED BY THE PLAINTIFF IN
OTHER EMPLOYMENT BETWEEN THE
DATE OF HIS DISMISSAL BY THE DEFENDANT AND THE DATE OF TRIAL;
(a)

IN HOLDING THAT THE MEASURE
OF DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF THE CONTRACT WAS THE AMOUNT PLAINTIFF
(bY
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WOULD HAVE EARNED HAD HE WORKED
EACH AND EVERY DAY AT HIS FORMER
EMPLOYMENT WITH THE DEFENDANT
BETWEEN THE RECEIPT BY DEFENDANT OF HIS APPLICATION F"OR REINSTATEMENT AND THE DAY OF TRIAL,
SEPTEMBER 7, 1950, A PERIOD IN EXCESS
OF FIVE YEARS;
(c) IN REFUSING TO PERMIT' THE DEFENDANT TO PROV·E THAT T'HE PLAINTIFF
DURING HIS EMPLOYMENT B·Y THE DEFENDANT WORKED ONLY A PO·RTION OF
THE TIME ALTHOUGH STE'ADY EMPLOYMENT WAS AVAILABLE TO HIM.
POINT V.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING
TO ALLOW THE DEFENDANT TO PROVE
THAT IT WAS POWERLESS TO REINSTAT·E
THE PLAINTIFF IN HIS EMPLOYMENT
AFTER THE EXPIRATION OF SIX MONTHS
FROM THE DATE OF DISMISSAL WITHOUT
THE CONSENT OF THE BROTHER.HOO·D OF
RAILROAD TRAINMEN, AND IN EXCLUDING
DEFENDANT'S PROFFER OF EVIDENCE TO
SHOW THAT THE BROTHERHOOD OF RAILROAD TRAINMEN WAS NEVER AT ANY
TIME WILLING TO CONSENT TO PLAINTIFF'S REINSTATEMENT BY THE DEFENDANT.
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POINT VI.
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT FAILED TO FIND
THAT THE PLAINTIFF WAS WITHOUT ANY
RIGHT TO MAINTAIN AN ACTION FOR
DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF THE CO~
TRACT, OR IF SUCH RIGHT AT ANY TIME
DID EXIST, IN FAILING T·O FIND THAT
PLAINTIFF WAS FORECLOSED AND ESTOPPED FROM ASSERTING THE SAME.
POINT VII.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ENTERING
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW WHOLLY UNSUPPORTED BY COMPETENT EVIDENCE IN THE CASE, AND IN
ENTERING ITS JUDGMENT UPON SUCH
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING
THE TRANSCRIPT OF THE PROCEEDINGS
AT T·HE OFFICIAL INVESTIGATION AS SUBSTANTIVE EVIDENCE OF THE FACTS
THEREIN STATED.
We think it might be helpful if at the very outset we
set forth just what the nature of this proceeding was in
the court below.
This case is a common-law action for breach of contract and nothing else. The trial court had the right to
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determine whether or not the collective bargaining agreement between the carrier and its employe, the plaintiff,
had been breached and to apply ordinary common-law principles of the law of damages in assessing damages, if it
- found that the defendant carrier had breached the contract.
That \Vas the full extent of the trial court's power to act in
rt
a proceeding of this kind, and it was wholly without juris:. diction to decide anything else. Slocum v. Delaware, Lackar
wana & Western Railroad,~9 U. S. 239, 94 L. Ed. 534, 70
S. Ct. 577, decided by the Supreme Court of the United
States April 10, 1950. Order of Railway Conductors v.
Southern Ra.iltvay Company, 339 U. S. 255, 94 L. Ed. 542,
70 S. Ct. 585, also decided by the Supreme Court of the
United States April 10, 1950. Order of Ra~lway Conductors
v. Pitney, 326 U. S. 561, 90 L. Ed. 318, 66 S. Ct. 322.
We think it is generally conceded that following the
decision of the United States Supreme Court in Moore v.
Illinois Central R. Co., 312 U. S. 630, 85 L. Ed. 1089, 61
S. Ct. 754, the bar, and bench both state and federal, considered that an employe of a carrier had an election to pursue his remedy for an alleged breach of a railway collective
bargaining agreement either before the administrative
body set up by the Railway Labor Act, that is, the National
Railroad Adjustment Board, or to take his grievance into
the courts, either state or federal. Whether such generally
held opinion was justified or not is really immaterial to
this discussion because the Supreme Court of the United
States in the Slocum case, supra, definitely held that the
jurisdiction of the Railroad Adjustment Board to adjust
grievances and disputes of all kinds arising out of collective bargaining agreements in the railroad industry, is
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exclusive; that no court, either state or federal, has. a right
to usurp the exclusive powers of the Railroad Adjustment
Board, the congressionally designated agency, to determine
any question involving the interpretation of such agreements. The case holds that no court, state or federal, has
the power to order reinstatement by a carrier of any employe. The decision does, however, countenance maintaining in a court a suit by an employe for damages for breach
of a collective bargaining agreement. This decision instantly drew the attention of the entire railroad industry
and has become a landmark.
Mr. Justice Black, who delivered the opinion of the
court, stated as follows:
"Section 3 of the Railway Labor Act confers
jurisdiction on the National Railway Adjustment
Board to hold hearings, make findings, and enter
awards in all disputes between carriers and their
employees 'growing out of grievances or out of the
interpretation or application of agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions
* * *.' The question presented is whether state
courts have power to adjudicate disputes involving
such interpretations when the Adjustment Board
has not acted."
T'he defendant railroad in the Slocum case had separate
collective bargaining agreements with the Orde·r of Railroad
Telegraphers and the Brotherhood of Railway Clerks. Each
organization claimed that its membe·rs were entitled to cer. tain jobs. The railroad agreed with the Clerks Union. The
telegraphers protested and, it appears, pursued their claims
as required under the Railway Labor Act in such respects
as was necessary and preliminary to invoking the j urisdic-
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tion of the National Railroad Adjustment Board. The railroad brought a suit for declaratory judgment in the New
York State court, praying for an interpretation of both
agreements and for a declaration that the clerks' agreement
covered the jobs in controversy and naming both unions
as defendants. The telegraphers moved to dismiss on the
grounds that the Railway Labor Act left the state court
without jurisdiction to interpret the contracts and adjudicate
the dispute. The motion was denied and the judgment denying the motion was affirmed by the Court of Appeals of
New York. As Mr. Justice Black stated in his opinion,
"The majority (of the New York Court of Appeals) thought that our opinion in Moore v. Illinois
Central R. Co., 312 U. S. 630, left state courts free
to adjudicate disputes arising out of a carrier-union
collective bargaining agreement without obtaining
the Board's interpretation of that agreement."
As we stated above, the New York Court of Appeals
was following the opinion generally held by the legal profession that the parties to collective bargaining agreements
in the railroad industry had a right to elect whether they
would present disputes under such agreements to the Railroad Adjustment Board or to the courts. While the facts
in the Slocum case, supra, are at variance with the case now
before this court, the principle which was therein adaudicated is clearly applicable. The opinion is short and we
quote therefrom such important portions as appear pertinent. Mr. Justice Black:
"In this case the dispute concerned interpretation of an existing bargaining agreement. Its
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spective importance to both the railroad and its employees, since the interpretation accepted would govern future relations of those parties. * * *
"The Act (Railway Labor Act) represents a
considered effort on the part of Congress to provide effective and desirable administrative remedies
for adjustment of railroad-employee disputes growing out of the interpretation of existing agreements.
The Adjustment Board is well equipped to exercise
its congressionally imposed functions. Its members
understand railroad problems and speak the railroad
jargon. Long and varied experiences have added to
the Board's initial qualifications. Precedents established by it, while not necessarily binding, provide
opportunities for a desirable degree of uniformity
in the interpretaton of agreements throughout the
nation's railway systems.
"The paramount importance of having these
chosen representatives of railroads and unions adjust grievances and disputes was emphasized by our
opinion in Order of Conductors v. Pitney, 326 U.
S. 561. There we held, in a case remarkably similar
to the one before us now, that the federal District
Court in its equitable discretion should have refused
'to adjudicate a jurisdictional dispute involving the
railroad and two employee accredited bargaining
agents.~ Our ground for this holding was. that the
court 'should not have interpreted the contracts'
but should have left this question for determination
by the Adjustment Board, a congressionally designated agency peculiarly competent in this field. This
reasoning equally supports a denial of power in any
court-state as well as federal-to invade the jurisdiction conferred on the Adjustment Board by the
Railway Labor Act.
"Our holding here is not inconsistent with our
holding in Moore v. Illinois Central R. Co., 312 U.
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S. 630. Moore was discharged by the railroad. He
could have challenged the validity of his discharge
before the Board, seeking reinstatement and back
pa.y. Instead he chose to accept the railroad's action
in discharging him as final, thereby ceasing to be an
employee, and brought suit claiming damages for
breach of contract. As we there held, the Railway
Labor Act does not bar courts from adjudicating
such cases. A common-law or statutory action for
wrongful discharge differs from any remedy which
the Board has power to provide and does not involve
questions of future relations between the railroad
and its other employees. If a court in handling such
a case must consider some provision of a collective
bargaining agreement its interpretation would of
course have no binding effect on future interpretations by the Board.
"'Ve hold that the jurisdiction of the Board to
adjust grievances and disputes of the type here involved is exclusive. The holding of the Moore case
does not conflict with this decision, and no contrary
inference should be drawn from any language in the
Moore opinion.''
The judgment of the New York Court of Appeals was
thus reversed and the cause was remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with the Supreme Court's. opinion.
In Order of Railway Conductors v. Southern Railway
Company, supra, decided by the Supreme Court of the
United States on the same day as the Slocum case, it appears that a dispute arose between certain conductors and
the railroad concerning the railroad's obligation under the
collective bargaining agreement to give the conductors
extra pay for certain services. Unable to agree through
negotiation, the railroad brought suit for a declaratory
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judgment seeking to have the court hold that the agreement
did not require the claimed payments. The declaratory judgment requested was. entered and the judgment affirmed
by the Supreme Court of South Carolina. The Supreme
Court of the United States, although the same principle was
decided the same day in the Slocum case, said as follows:
'~For

reasons set out in the Slocum case, we hold
that the South Carolina court was without power to
interpret the terms of this agreement and adjudicate
the dis.pute.. We discuss this case separate.ly because
it sharply points up the conflicts that could arise
from state court intervention in railroad-union disputes. After the railroad had sued in the state court,
the union filed a petition for hearing and award before the Adjustment Board. The state court nevertheless proceeded to adjudicate the dispute. Sustaining the state court's action would invite races of
diligence whenever a carrier or union preferred one
forum to the other. And if a carrier or a union could
choose a court instead of the Board, the other party
would be deprived of the privilege conferred by
Section 3 First ( i) of the Railway Labor Act, 45
U. S. C. A. Section 153 First (i), which provides,
that after negotiations have failed 'either party' may
refer the dispute to the appropriate division of the
Adjustment Board. The judgment * * * is reversed."
The Supreme Court of the United States thus holds that
an employe accepting his dis·charge as final may bring a
suit in the courts, state or federal, in the nature of a common-law action for breach of contract and that there is
nothing els.e he may maintain a suit for, based on any right
growing out of a collective bargaining agreement between
a carrier and its employes, and that no court has jurisdiction
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to determine any other question under such agreements. It

may be that a court, as was said in the Slocum case, "in
handling a case must consider some provision of a collective bargaining agreement" in order to determine whether
or not there has been a breach. It is difficult to see how
a court could determine whether or not such a contract
had been breached without examining the contract. But the
Slocum case clearly holds that that is the full extent of the
court's power. The instant cas~ was tried by the defendant
on such a theory and on the authority above set out. It is
an old-fashioned, garden-variety, common-law suit for
breach of contract and nothing else, and the measure of damages for a breach, if found, is to be determined by the
common-law and decisional law of damages.
Being an ordinary common-law action for breach of
contract, we cannot understand why it should not be tried
as such; why the plaintiff should not be entitled to produce
all competent material evidence available to prove the defendant breached the contract; and why the defendant
should not be permitted to produce witnesses, documentary
evidence, and defend by introducing any competent material
evidence available to show that it had not breached the
contract. Instead of trying the case as a simple suit for
breach of contract, the court, over our objection, permitted
a transcript of unsworn testimony given at the official investigation conducted by the carrier to be introduced as substantive evidence, excluded every particle of evidence offered by the defendant in defense of the charge that the
contract had been breached, and decided the case against
the defendant solely and exclusively upon a typewritten
sheet of unsworn testimony.
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The plaintiff's· entire case consisted of the introduction of the transcript of the testimony taken at the investigation (Plaintiff's Ex. "A") ; a letter written by J. B.
Hudgens, Local Chairman of the Switchmen's Union of
North America, to Mr. R. E. Edens, defendant's superintendent, dated January 14, 1946, asking reinstatement of
the plaintiff (Plaintiff's Ex. "B") ; Superintendent Edens'
reply to Mr. Hudgens of January 22, 1946 declining toreinstate the plaintiff (Plaintiff's Ex. "C") ; and a letter from
Mr. C. E. McDaniels, Acting Vice President of the Switchmen's Union of North America, to Mr. F. C. Paulsen, Vice
President of the defendant company, dated February 15,
1946, again asking reinstatement of the plaintiff (Plaintiff's Ex. "D") . The plaintiff did not take the witness stand
and called no other witnesses. The defendant stipulated as
to what plaintiff's rate of pay would have been between the
date of his dismissal and the date of trial had he not been
discharged, having actually furnished these figures to the
plaintiff, and also stipulated that the plaintiff could have,
had he desired, worked steadily between the date of his dismissal and the date of trial, with the understanding that
we were not admitting that plaintiff would have done so
(Tr. 11, 12). The defendant offered no objection to any of
plaintiff's exhibits, except Exhibit "A", the transcript of
investigation, but as to Exhibit "A" we stated as follows:
"Mr. Bronson: I have an objection, your Honor.
I am not willing to stipulate that Exhibit ''A" be
received. I am willing to stipulate as to B, C and
D that they may be received.
"The Court:. As to Exhibit aA", is there an objection?
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""Mr. Bronson: Yes, I object on the grounds that
it is hearsay and self-serving, and in a proceeding
in a court can only be used to the extent it states an
exception to the hearsay rule by virtue of admissions
it may contain therein. I am wililng to stipulate
plaintiff's proposed Exhibit "A" is a transcript of
the proceedings had at the time of the investigation
of Russell, with the exception of the answer to the
last question on Page 1, which, I understand, is
changed, which was changed.
"The Court: \Vith the pencil mark around it?
"Mr. Bronson: Yes, but your Honor will observe-"The Court: You mean it was changed after the
hearing?
"lVIr. Bronson: Before he signed it. I don't contend he had a right to." (Tr. 5.)
The colloquy between counsel and the court indicates
the position we now take with respect to the admission of
this transcript. Of course it could be used at the trial the
same as any other document that might contain written admissions, and might be used by either party, if used only
for impeachment purposes. The plaintiff was not sworn
at the official investigation, was under no compulsion except that of his own conscience to testify truthfully ; but
even though he had been sworn, it would not have made
this transcript admissible in evidence as truth of the matters therein stated, that is, as substantive evidence.
In the case of Tennison v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry.
Co., ... Mo .... , 228 S. W. 2d 718, which was decided by the
Supreme Court of Missouri March 13, 1950, and which we
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cited to the trial court and discussed at length (Tr. 7), the
facts were as follows : The plaintiff had been discharged
by his carrier employer following an investigation, for being
intoxicated in violation of one of the defendant's operating
rules. The contract involved provided:
"Trainmen shall not be suspended, discharged,
or unfavorable entries made against their records
without just and sufficient cause. In case a trainman is taken off of his run he shall be given a hearing within five days from the time he is taken off,
and shall be given sufficient notice in person or in
writing, in advance, to have a trainman of his own
choice present, who shall be permitted to examine all
witnesses and papers pertaining to the case. Charges
shall be specific, and he shall have the right to produce witnesses to testify in his behalf. If a trainman is found guilty he will be notified in writing
within five days, discipline assessed and cause. If
held out of or removed from service unjustly, he will
be reinstated, and paid for all time lost."
It was stipulated that the. plaintiff was familiar with
the rule he was charged with violating. An official investigation was held at the office of the defendant's. assistant
superintendent and several trainmen made statements there
which were reported and transcribed. They were not sworn.
The plaintiff testified that he was not intoxicated but that
he was "sick." Several of the witnesses at the investigation testified that in their opinion the plaintiff was intoxicated, although one of the witnesses-a brakeman by
the name of Foster-testified that he had seen the plaintiff
at 5:45 A.M. at ·Newburg; that he had not seen him at
any point prior to that; that he observed his actions and

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

25
appearance; that his speech was normal and his appearance
was normal and there were no signs of his being intoxicated. Foster was not called to testify at the· trial and the
court received in evidence the transcript of this unsworn
testimony of Foster's given at the investigation. The plaintiff recovered a judgment and the Supreme Court of
Missouri reversed, holding that Foster's testimony at the
official investigation was hearsay and inadmissible. The
court said, at p. 720 :
"This statement was, of course, hearsay; but
plaintiff contends it was admissible as a declaration
against interest of Foster, as a part of the records
of defendant and also because of the contract with
the Trainmen's Union. None of these contentions
can be_ sustained."
This case is as nearly in point on the facts and the law
involved as one would ever expect to find, and the court
further stated :
"Plaintiff further claims that the contract with
the union required the defendant to justify its action
solely upon what was brought out in its investigation and argues that no other evidence can be heard
at the triaL However, plaintiff does. not wish to so
limit himself. Apparently he claims Foster's statement is admissible on that basis; and he also claims
that, at least, the contract authorized its use on the
theory the agreement was that 'discipline assessed
against an employee would be based on evidence
brought out at an investigation held by defendant'
as provided in the contract. Such claimed construction of the contract is unreasonable. What the contract provided was that trainmen would not be discharged 'without just and sufficient cause.' Methods
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were provided for a full investigation of charges and
hearing of the employee's side before action. However, defendant is no more precluded thereby from
litigating in court the issue of 'just and sufficient
cause' than is plaintiff. Both may bring in any
competent evidence they have and obiect to any incompetent evidence; and there is no estoppel against
defendant because Foster was heard at the investigation required by the contract.
"Plaintiff further argues that Foster's statement was not hearsay because the investigation was
conducted by defendant and its officers had the
right to examine him. The trouble with this contention is that it was not a proceeding before any one
authorized to administer an oath or the power to
compel answers, which is essential to effective crossexamination. (Citing 5 Wigmore (3rd Ed.) 58, Sec.
1376; 8 Wigmore 73, Sec. 2195; Bartlett v. Kansas
City Public Service Co., 349 Mo. 13, 160 S. W. 2d
740, 142 A. L. R. 666.) We hold that this statement
was hearsay and that it was not admissible under
any exception to the hearsay rule."
To like effect is the case of Johnson v. Thompson,
Mo. . .. , 236 S. W. 2d 1, decided. December 5, 1950.
This was a suit by the administratrix of a deceased conductor for damages for breach of a collective bargaining
agreement in which it was claimed that the deceased had
been discharged ¥rithout "good and sufficient cause" and
"without a fair and impartial trial." The charge at the investigation was for violation of Rule G of the company
which prohibited use of intoxicants. At the trial a witness
named Ogletree, "\\"'ho was present at the official investigation, was. allowed to testify that at the investigation Johnson,
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the conductor, denied that he was intoxicated at the time
and place charged. The court held :
"This testimony was clearly inadmissible (citing the Tennison case, supra). It is not admissible
under any exception to the hearsay rule."
The court further said:
"Under the issues to be decided in this case this
testimony was very important. The defense relies
solely upon the issue that the deceased Johnson reported for duty as conductor on defendant railroad
while under the influence of intoxicants and unfit
for service. The proof, therefore, that defendant
denied being intoxicated at the hearing was on the
very issue to be decided in the case, and therefore
constituted reversible error."
Here, again, the court is holding that the case is to
be tried "de novo." That in the trial of the issue as to
whether or not the defendant was guilty of the charged
violation the unsworn testimony given at the official investigation cannot be admitted as substantive evidence of
the facts therein stated. It is precisely what we contend for
on this assignment of error.
We cannot state our position any more succinctly than
is set forth in the above opinions. A comparison of the
agreen1ent in the instant case with that involved in the
Tennison and Johnson cases, supra, reveals that they are
substantially the same in those particulars involved in this
suit. These decisions are in accord with the holding of the
Supreme Court of the United States in the Slocum case,
supra ; that is, they have treated the situation as a simple
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common-law action for breach of contract and held, as we
contend for here, that there is. no reason for following
diffe·rent procedure or applying different rules of evidence
than are customarily applied in such actions.
The discussion of this assignment of error may appear
to be unnecessarily extensive to dispose of the simple principle of evidence involved, but it seemed to us desirable to
cover at the outset some of the law in this case in a general
way. We assert that the trial court committed reversible
error in admitting the transcript of the unsworn statements
made at ,the official investigation as substantive evidence of
the facts therein stated in the face of the objection made.

POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN REFUSING T'O GRANT THE
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A JUDGMENT
OF NON.SUIT.
The only evidence offered by the plaintiff in addition
to the transcript of the investigation, was the letter of
January 14, 1946, from J. B. Hudgens, Local Chairman of
the Switchmen's Union of North America, to defendant's
superintendent, R. E. Edens, asking reinstatement of the
plaintiff (Plaintiff's Ex. "B") ; Mr. Edens' reply thereto
of January 22, 1946, declining plaintiff's. reinstatement
(Plaintiff's Ex. "C") ; the letter of C. E. McDaniels, Acting
Vice President of the SUNA, dated February 15, 1946, to
Mr. Paulsen, the defendant's. Vice President, asking reinstatement of the plaintiff (Plaintiff's. Ex. "D") ; in addition
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to which we stipulated that the plaintiff, had he been so
disposed, could have worked steadily between the date of
his dismissal and the date of trial, and we stipulated as to
what his rate of pay would have been had he elected to woi"k
(Tr. 11, 12). There cannot be the slightest doubt but that
the plaintiff failed to make a prima facie case, if it is concluded that it was error to admit over our objection the
transcript of the unsworn statements made at the official
investigation. If it was error to admit the transcript as
substantive evidence of the matters therein stated, the
plaintiff's case when he rested was completely destitute of
any competent evidence showing a breach of the contract
by the defendant and the court should have granted the
motion for a nonsuit which was made (Tr. 13).
Even though it was proper for the court to admit the
transcript as substantive evidence of the facts therein
stated, it was and is our position that nothing therein contained established a prima facie case of breach of the
contract, but on the contrary, such evidence affirmatively
established the fact that defendant had not breached the
agreement.
The only charge in the complaint which plaintiff attempted to prove to establish breach on the part of the
defendant was that the defendant "wrongfully and arbitrarily discharged the plaintiff" and "dismissed him without
* * * cause." Article VIII, Section 38, of the agreement provides in part, and so far as pertinent, as follows :
"Investigations: No yardman will be suspended
or dismissed without first having a fair and impartial hearing and his guilt established. The man
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whose case is under consideration may be represented by an employe of his choice, who may be a
committeeman, who will be permitted to interrogate
witnesses. The accused and his representative shall
be permitted to hear the testimony of witnesses.
Charges will be investigated within 5 days and the
result of the investigation will be made known within 3 days.
Article XIII, Sec. 55, provides as follows :
"(b) Yardmen taking leave of absence for a
period of over ten days must secure and fill out
Form 153 so the leave will be covered as a matter
of record.''
It appears from the transcript of the official investigation that the plaintiff was fully aware of the rule which required him to secure and fill out Form 153 to cover an
absence in excess of ten days. The following testimony is
taken from the transcript, the questions by Mr. H. Caulk,
defendant's Assistant Superintendent, the answers by the
plaintiff:
Do you know the rule that you will not
absent yourself from duty ten days or over without
written leave?
"Q.

"A.

Yes, sir.

"Q.

Why didn't you obtain written leave?
Because I was sick in bed at the time.

"A.

Why didn't you ask the office for a leave
of absence?
"Q.

"A. I called just as. soon as I got out of bed,
soon as thA~y called me and told me I was over it."
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At the bottom of the second page of the transcript the
follo,ving question and answer appear, the question by Mr.
Hudgens, Local Chairman of the SUNA, who was representing the plaintiff :
"Q. And you talked to train desk before the
expiration of your ten days?
" ...L\.. No. They called me on the 31st, they called
me out of bed at 6:30 A.M. and told me to be here
for investigation and I was too sick and couldn't
make it."

Now it appears to us from the last two questions and
answers quoted above that in spite of the fact that the
rule required Forn1 153 to be filled out to cover an absence
in excess of ten days, that the management, in case the
plaintiff was sick, would have considered the rule sufficiently complied with if the plaiptiff had called the office or the
train desk on the telephone or had someone do s.o on his
behalf. Both the examiner and the union representative,
Hudgens, by their questions indicated that a telephone call
by plaintiff or someone in his behalf would, in case of sickness, be considered compliance with the rule, even though
Form 153 was not filled out. When the plaintiff answered,
"I called just as soon as I got out of bed, soon as they called
me and told me I was over it," he was referring to the
call he received from the company advising him to appear
for an official investigation. There is nothing in the transcript ~and there was nothing in the evidence to indicate
that anyone called him at any time and told him he "was
over it" and he clears this up in his answer to the last question quoted from the transcript above wherein he admits
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that he never ·called the train desk before the expiration of
the ten days, and never got in touch with his employer until
his employer called him on the 31st of July, 1945. As in
the case of 'l'ennison v. St. Louis~San Francisco R. Co.,
supra, the fact that he failed to comply with a company rule
and regulation, of which he was fully aware, is sufficient
to justify his dismissal in the absence of a showing that he
was disabled from complying therewith. He gave as his
reasons for not complying with the rule that he was "sick."
He gave no reason as to why his wife or someone else could
not, at his request, have notified his employer that he was
sick and would be absent in excess of ten days, even though
it was a fact that he was "sick." The questions and answers
contained in the transcript may seem somewhat innocuous
to one not fully conversant, as was said in the Slocum
case, supra, with "railroad problems and railroad jargon."
However, to one familiar with the on-the-ground operation
of carrier-employe disciplinary matters, these questions and
answers take on a great deal of significance. The examiner
called the plaintiff's attention to the f~t that since the
first of 1945 and up until the time he was summoned for
an investigation he had worked much less. than half the
time; that he had worked 16 days in January, 13 days in
February, 12 days in March, 8 days in April, 10 days in
May, 3 days in June, 6 days in July, although with respect
to July it is admitted he was off work part of the time
owing to having been scalded while off duty. The plaintiff did not dispute the fact that he was only working a few
days each half. What is the significance of this? By working a few days. each half of a month this man retained his
seniority and continued to build up seniority. Such conduct
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left him free to occupy himself for the most part in any
way he saw fit other than attending to his job with the
defendant. Such conduct was seriously prejudicial to the
rights of the defendant's other employees on the seniority
list, and for the company to tolerate it certainly violates the
spirit, if not the letter, of the agreement. It will be said that
he was not charged with this offense. Assuming this to be
true, can it be said that such admitted conduct on his part
did not involve his credibility and furnish a reasonable
basis for the examiner to doubt his word when he endeavored to explain his violation of the offense he was
charged with by stating that he was "sick." He admitted
that he knowingly violated the rule he was charged with
violating. We do not think that the examiner was any
more required to believe his explanation that he was "sick"
than a jury would be required to believe such testimony in
the trial of either a civil or criminal action. It should be
again pointed out that the employe in these investigations
cannot be required to give sworn testimony.
The plaintiff was asked the following questions :
"Q.

I understand you own a club up the canyon.

"A.

I don't.

"Q.

You work up there don't you?

"A.

Yes."

When it came time for the plaintiff to sign the transcript of the testimony he struck out the answer "yes" and
wrote in pencil "no." We do not contend that he did not have
a right to do this, but we do contend that the examiner had
a right to believe that the truth was "yes" and not "no."
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We think the foregoing question and answer has some bearing on the plaintiff's credibility when he stated he was
"sick" and the examiner had a right to consider it. Does
any member of the court believe, or does anyone believe,
that a few months ago when the railway system of the
United States was so badly crippled that the federal government had to intervene on account of thousands of switchmen simultaneously reporting "sick," that they were in
fact "sick?"
The evidence with respect to the plaintiff's working but
a few days each half over a long period of time and admitting and later denying that he had other employment,
has an additional significance in that the examiner was
entitled to take it into consideration in connection with the
assessing of discipline.
The National Railroad Adjustment Board has consistently held that the imposition of discipline will not be
reviewed unless in their opinion the carrier's judgment was
arbitrary or in bad faith and even though, had the Board
been sitting in judgment originally, they would have imposed less drastic discipline, and that not only the charge
under investigation but the employe's general conduct during the period of his employment may be considered by the
employer in imposing discipline. In Award No. 9'542 of
the National Railroad Adjustment Board, BofLF&E v.
Reddting Company, it was said:
"The discipline of employes is, .necessarily, a
prerogative of management. Imposing discipline,
under this prerogative, involves the exercise of dis·
cretion on the part of management, which, while
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it may not be abused, should not be interfered with
when reasonably exercised."
In Award No. 10649, Engineers v. Southern Pacific,
the Board said :
"In a case of discipline this division interferes
to set aside or to modify a decision only when the
procedure adopted by the carrier has denied to an
employe a fundamental right or when the decision
imposing the discipline is manifestly unjust."
In Award No. 13356, Trainmen v. Union Pacific, it was
said:
"The carrier duly charged its employe, one
Price, with violation of certain operating rules and
upon hearing thereof said employe was found to
have violated said rules, and the discipline ass.essed
was dismissal. The credibility of the witnesses and
the weight to be given their testimony is determined
by the hearing officer and in the absence of a showing his judgment was arbitrary or capricious, it
will not be disturbed."
In Award No. 12883, Conductors and Trainmen v.
Kansas, Oklahoma & Gulf, the Board said:
"The severity of the discipline imposed is not
subject to determination here."
The Railroad Adjustment Board has also consistently
held that in assessing discipline an employe's past record
may be taken into consideration. In Award No. 1599,
Porters v. The Pullman Company, the Board said:
"In disciplinary matters it is not only proper,
but essential, in the interest of justice, to take past
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record into consideration. What might be just and
fair discipline to an employe whose past record is
good, might, and usually would, be utterly inadequate
discipline for an employe with a bad record."
In Award No. 4229, Porters v. The Pullman Company,
a disciplinary action for insubordination, the Board said:
"The organization also objected to the consideration or review of a past incident of insubordination by claimant. We have said before that in fixing
the penalty it is proper to consider the past record of
an employe." (Citing Award 1599.)
In Award No. 1·2427, O·RC v. Western Pacific Railroad
Company, the Board took into consideration the claimant's
past good record, ameliorating the discipline assesed on
account thereof. The Board said :
"In view of the claimant's past record and the
circumstances under which the violation occurred,
we think the discipline imposed was excessive in
considering the nature of the offense. In view of the
length of time the claimant has been out of service
by reason of the sentence imposed, we think he has
been sufficiently disciplined and that he should now
be immediately reinstated with seniority rights unimpaired but without pay for time lost."
In A ward No. 12429; Brotherhood of Railroad TraiJn,.
men v. Western Pacific Railroad Company, the Board said:
"There is. ample evidence in the record to sustain
the carrier's finding that claimant was guilty of
violating its operating rules as charged. Such
finding authorized the carri.er to impose discipline.
Of course, this authority must not be abused by imposing excessive discipline and thus arbitrarily take
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from such employe rights which he had earned under
the agreement. But this does not mean that the
carrier must in every instance impose the same
sentence for like or similar offenses. What it does
mean is that the sentence imposed in each case
should be reasonable, that is, just and proper, considering the nature of the offense and the past record of the employe involved .."
In Award No. 13142, BofLF&E v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, the Board said:
"Past record, good or bad, may be taken into
consideration in fixing the discipline."
The above quotations could be multiplied by the score
but the above awards are all recent and reflect the consistent attitude of the National Railroad Adjustment Board.
We do not say that the opinions of the Railroad Adjustment
Board are binding on our courts, but when the Supreme
Court of the United States has said that Congress placed
exclusive jurisdiction in the Railroad Adjustment Board to
interpret collective bargaining agreements between carriers and employes, their opinions and interpretations, it
seems to us, should carry considerable persuasion with the
courts.

;...

The Railway Labor Act was never designed to interfere
with the discretion of a carrier in selecting its own employes
or in discharging them. There reposes in the carrier full
discretion to discharge any of its employes at any time and
for any cause except as it may be inhibited by some provision in the collective bargaining agreement.
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In Texas, N. 0. R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Railway and
Steamship Clerks·, 281 U. S. 548, 74 L. Ed. 1034 at 1046, 50
S. Ct. 427, it was said:
"The Railway Labor Act of 1926 does not interfere with the normal exercise of the right of the
carrier to select its employes or to discharge them.
The statute is not aimed at this right of the employers but at the interference with the right of employes to have representatives of their own choosing."
In Virginia Railway Co. v. System Federation No. 40,
300 U. S. 515, 81 L. Ed. 781, 57 S. Ct. 592, the Supreme
Court again said, referring to the provisions of the Railway Labor Act:
"They do not interfere with the normal exercise
of the right of the carrier to select its employes or
to discharge them."
In Beeler v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 169 F. 2d 557,
the court said:
"The act does not interfere with the normal
right of the employer to select its employes or discharge them or to create or abolish positions, so
long as it does not impair the collective bargaining
process."
It is a matter of general knowledge, at least among all
of those who have had the slightest contact with the Railroad Adjustment Board, that before that tribunal the employe fares exceedingly well. Perhaps we should not question the plaintiff's election to sue for damages in our
courts., which he has a right to do, but he originally started
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out to secure not only damages, but an order for reinstatement at the hands of the court. It is extremely rare for an
employe to forego the advantage he has before the Board in
a controversy \vith the employing carrier. We do not believe this court has ever had before it a case of this. nature.
\Ve feel justified in assuming that plaintiff and his counsel
\Vere pessimistic about selling the Railroad Adjustment
Board the "bill of goods" they so successfully pawned off
on the trial court in this case.
In denying defendant's motion for a nonsuit we understood the court to indicate that even though the plaintiff
was guilty of the charge, it did not involve a "substantial"
breach and should not be considered a breach of the contract
warranting any disciplinary action (Tr. 15). We do not
think such a construction by the court was warranted and
before the case was concluded we offered to prove that the
rule had been generally enforced against employes who
violated it, and we offered to prove that Mr. Hudgens, the
Local Chairman of the Switchmen's Union of North America, had himself been dismissed from the service of the
company for a violation of this very rule which plaintiff
was charged with violating. The court refused to permit
the proof, which was error, if the reason for denying the
motion for nonsuit was because he did not consider plaintiff's violation of Rule 55 (b) a substantial breach. And
further, in this connection, we do not think that the court
has a right and we are sure the Railroad Adjustment Board
would not think it had the right, to determine whether the
breach of any given operating rule was or was not sufficient
to warrant discipline by the carrier, but that this is a pre-
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rogative to be exercised in the- discretion of the management.
Absenteeism is of peculiar concern to the railroad industry.
No rule is more strictly enforced. The necessities of the
business require it. The defendant is a public utility charged
by government fiat with maintaining the "free and uninterrupted flow of interstate commerce." The absence of a
very few employes at any given point without their giving
notice to the carrier so as to enable it to provide other employes, can cripple operations, delay trains and cause all
manner of disturbance, to the detriment of the public
generally. The rule must be enforced against the engineer
of a streamline train as well as against a switchman, it
must be and is enforced against all employes whose duties
involve the movement of trains.
We think the plaintiff's evidence showed a failure on
his part, without any excuse therefor, to comply with what
he knew to be an important rule of the company governing
his employment. Even had he been "sick" he was not so
disabled that he could not have complied with the rule in
question or notified his employer of his intended absence
from duty. The contract makes no exception for failure to
comply with the rule on account of sickness. If an employe
was unconscious, or in jail, or subject to any condition
where it was really impossible for him to give notice of his
absence, no one would try to enforce this provision of the
contract against him. Such a situation would rarely arise.
We know from common experience that an employe can and
does let the "boss" know when he is. unable to come to work.
We think that the trial court committed reversible
error in refusing to grant defendant's motion for a nonsuit,
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even though it is held that the court was justified in deciding the case solely on the unsworn testimony taken at the
official investigation.

POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN LIMITING
THE EVIDENCE ON THE QUESTION OF
WHETHER OR NOT DEFENDANT· HAD
BREACHED THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT SOLELY UPON THE
TRANSCRIPT OF THE UNSWORN TESTIMONY GIVEN AT THE OFFICIAL INVESTIGATION; IN REFUSING TO ADMIT EVIDENCE PROFFERED BY THE DEF'ENDANT
TO SHOW JUSTIFICATION FOR PLAINTIFF'S
DISMISSAL; AND IN REFUSING TO PERMIT
THE DEFENDANT TO PROVE THAT PLAINTIFF'S TESTIMONY CONTAINED IN SAID
TRANSCRIPT WAS F AL.S,E.
Our contention in connection with the first phase of
this assignment of error is that the court should have permitted, as was said in the Tennison case, supra, bo:th sides
"to bring in any evidence they have and object to any incompetent evidence," in determining whether or not the
defendant had breached the contract in dismissing the plaintiff. In other words, the trial court on the authority not.
only of the Tennison and Johnson cases, but of the Slocum
case, in trying a simple common-law action for breach of
a contract, should have permitted an investigation de nov·o
to determine whethe~r or not the defendant. was warranted
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in dismissing the plaintiff from service. The position we
contend for under the first phase of this assignment of
error is simply another facet of the assignment of error
discussed under Point I and the cases there cited and the
argument there made are equally applicable at this point.
We will not prolong this brief by unnecessa~ry repetition,
and we incorporate herein what was said on this. matter
in our discussion under Point I.
To show justification for the plaintiff's dismissal we
offered to prove that during the four years beginning with
the 18th of August, 1941, up to the 1st of August, 1945, when
the plaintiff was. dismissed, he could have, had he so desired, worked every day ; and owing to the fact that the
war was in progress could have frequently worked a double
shift. That, in fact, during this period of time his earnings
for the year 1941 were $888.00; 19,42, $2,449.27; 1943,
$2,308.44; 1944, $1,622.71; and the first seven months. of
1945 preceding his. dismissal a total of $431.71. It thus
appears that his total earnings. for a period of four years
aggregated $7,700.13 (Tr. 34, 35, 52, 53). We offered to
show that during the ten day period that he was. off the
job without having notified his employer by filling out
Form 153 or notifying his employer of his absence in any
other way, that he was. in fact working and operating a
"beer joint" in Ogden Canyon, and to prove that when he
testified at the official investigation with respect to this
matter that his. testimony was. false (Tr. 37). We. also
offered to prove that during this period of time he was
not "down in bed" as he said; that he did not consult a
doctor until the seventh day after he laid off; that he then
walked into the. doctor's office complaining of an earache,
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saw the doctor only on that one occasion, and tha;t after
he had received notice that he was dismissed from service
he went to Dr. Stratford, who had treated him on the one
occasion, who did not then know that he had been dismissed,
and got a release indicating that he was able to work (Tr.
37). We did prove, without objection, that the witness
Combe, for whom the plaintiff had worked as a bartender
intermittently from the year 1941 until May of 1950, was
the owner of the Pine View Inn in Ogden ·Canyon, and that
the establishment was leased in the name of the plaintiff's
wife, Mrs. Russell, as lessee ( Tr. 32) . We were ready and
we offered to prove that the plaintiff himself was, at the
time he claimed to be sick during the ten day period which
was the subject of investigation, actually operating and
working at this establishment and had been operating the
same for many months prior thereto. We also offered to
prove that Dr. Keith Stratford, the company doctor, although he gave Mr. Russell a "return to work release," subsequent to Russell's dismissal and without knowledge thereof, when Russell came to his office and requested it, would
nonetheless testify that Russell, in spite of the complaint
he made when he visited the doctor seven days. after he
laid off-Dn July 21, 1945-was. able to work and perform
all the duties of his employment, and that during the ten
.......... days the plaintiff was. off without leave (which was. the
subject of investigation) he was able to wo~k and discharge the duties of his position ( Tr. 53).

All of the foregoing offers of proof were rejected by
. . ; ; ; ; ; ; . the court. In this connection, the admission contained in
: : : : : : : : : Mr. C. E. McDaniels.' letter to Mr. F. ~c. Paulsen dated May
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14, 1946 (Defendant's Ex. "3") that the plaintiff did, in
fact, give false testimony at the, investigation held August
3, 1945, which culminated in his dismissal, should have had
great weight.
We submit that the court committed reversible error
in refusing to permit the defendant to make the above proof.
We think under the holdings of the Supreme Court of the
United States designating this type of action as a simple
suit for breach of contract and the holding in the Tennison
and Johnson cases, supra, that we were entitled to offer
such evidence as would justify our dismissal of Russell,
and if we are right in this proposition, we do not think it
necessary to belabor the matter further. It seems to us
obvious that the evidence we offered to produce was an1ply
sufficient to justify the defendant company in dismissing
the plaintiff and we should have been permitted to introduce it.
POINT IV.
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN ASSESSING AND FIXING
DAMAGES:
(a) IN REFUSING TO ALLOW AS MITIGATION OF DAMAGES THE AMOUNT OF
MONEY EARNED BY THE PLAINTIFF IN
OTHER EMPLOYMENT BETWEEN THE
DATE OF HIS DISMISSAL BY THE DEFENDANT AND THE DATE OF TRIAL;
(b) IN HOLDING THAT THE MEASURE
OF DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF THE CON-
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TRACT WAS THE AMOUNT PLAINTIFF
WOULD HAVE EARNED HAD HE WORKED
EACH AND EVERY DAY AT HIS FORMER
EMPLOYMENT WITH THE DEFENDANT
BETWEEN THE RECEIPT BY DEFENDANT OF HIS APPLICATION FOR REINSTATEMENT AND THE DAY OF TRIAL,
SEPTEMBER 7, 1950, A PERIOD IN EXCESS
OF FIVE YEARS;
(c) IN REFUSING TO PERMIT THE DEFENDANT TO PROVE THAT THE P'LAINTIFF
DURING HIS EMP·LOYMENT BY THE DEFENDANT WORKED ONLY A PO·RTION OF
THE TIME ALTHOUGH 8T'EADiY EMPLOYMENT WAS A VAIL.ABLE TO HIM.
(a) The defendant pleaded affirmatively that any
damage plaintiff might have suffered could have been mitigated by the plaintiff and averted or avoided, in whole or
in part, by plaintiff's securing remunerative employment
after his dismissal other than employment by the defendant (R. 6).

We believe it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to
prove his damages, if any, occasioned by the alleged breach
of the contract by defendant, the same as is required of the
plaintiff in any other common-law action for contract
breach. There is not one word of testimony in the entire
record to indicate what plaintiff's damage if any was, and
so far as the record shows, he may have earned at other
..... employment in excess of what he might have been able to
l))' earn between the date of his dismissal and the date of trial

uu

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

46
had he continued in the employ of the defendant. We were
able to locate several parties for whom the plaintiff had
worked between the date of his dismissal and the date of
trial and served these employers with a subpoena duces
tecum. Their undisputed evidence showed that the plaintiff between the date of his dismissal and the date of trial
earned at other employment the sum of $7,774.39. The court
indicated at the outset that he considered the evidence immaterial, but because the testimony was to be short and the
witnesses were all in court wih their records, consented, at
our solicitation, to hear the testimony and reserve a ruling
(Tr. 19). In the decision the court completely disregarded
this showing, refusing to mitigate the damages in the
amount proved to have been earned by the plaintiff in
other employment.
The witness, H. B. McEwan, an accountant ·who kept
the books for the H&A Annex, a beer dispensary, testified
that between March 15 and October 15, 1947, the plaintiff
for his services as a bartender was paid the sum of $1583.80
(Tr. 19, 20).
The witness David H. Hadley, who operated a sand and
gravel business, produced in court his business records
showing that the plaintiff for his services as a truck driver
was paid in the month of November, 1947, $156.67; in December, 1947, $152.04; in January, 1948, $56.05; in March,
1948, $99.24; in April, 1948, $298.52; in May, 1948, $228.33,
and in June, 1948, $120.29, an aggregate of $1111.14. These
records are identified as defendant's Exhibit "1", and it
was admitted that the records were kept in the regular
course of the witness' business (Tr. 24) (Defendant's Ex.
"1").
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The 'vitness Earl W. Folkman, manager of Dr. Pepper
Bottling "rorks in Ogden, testified that from October,
1948 to the date of trial his company paid the plaintiff
$4,879.45 for services as a "driver salesman" (Tr. 27, 28).
The witness Frank Combe, owner of the Marion Bar,
testified that he was a personal friend of the plaintiff and
had paid him the sum of $200.00 for tending bar between
December, 1949 and June, 1950 (Tr. 28). He also testified
that the plaintiff had tended bar for him during the years
1942, 1943 and 1944, sometimes at night and sometimes
in the day, which was during the period of time the plaintiff was employed by the defendant as a switchman (Tr. 29,
30). He could not or would not produce any intelligible
business records.
The aggregate amount of the earnings as shown above
constitutes the figure of $7,774.39 shown to have been earned in other employment by the plaintiff.

We think that the failure of the court to take into account the monies earned by the plaintiff in other employment was to do something more than to make the plaintiff
"whole." The damages of $18,892.76 which the court awarded and the amount shown to have been earned in other
employment brings the plaintiff's reward to the sum of
$26,667.15 for the period of five years following his dis.missal. This is not damages, but a penalty and one the
trial court had no right whatsoever to exact from the defendant in this proceeding. The plaintiff Russell, we offered to prove, earned only the sum of $7,700.13 during the
--------- entire four year period he was employed by the defendant
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(Tr. 35). As stated, he introduced not one word of testimony or· other evidence tending to establish his damage,
if any.
It is. an elementary rule of the general law of damages
that one must exercise reasonable care to prevent the enhancement of any damages caused by wrongful act. This
rule applies in suits for breach of contracts of employment. In 56 C. J. S., Section 59, it is stated:
"A discharged servant cannot lie by unemployed
for the remainder of the term, and then claim full
compensation; he is bound to make the best use of
his time, and seek other employment. Where the
amount received in other employment equals or exceeds that contracted for, there can be no recovery."
In 56 C. J. S., Section 28 (120), it is said with respect
to actions for breach of a contract of employment:
"General
to actions by
breach of his
employer and

rules as to trial and judgment apply
an employe against his employer for
rights under a contract between the
the employe's organization. * * *

"The measure of damages for breach of an employment contract is the amount an employe would
have received as wages had the contract been performed, less the amount he has earned during the
period."
In 35 Am. J ur ., Master and Servant, Section 57, it is
said:
.
"It is a principle of the law of damages that all
facts and circumstances which go to show a reduction in the amount necessary to compensate the
plaintiff or account for injuries sustained by the
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breach of a contract may be shown in mitigation of
damages. * * * The defendant employer may
show in reduction of the damages the fact that the
employe actually engaged in other profitable employment."
This is the generally applied common-law rule of
damages for breach of a contract of employment, and it is
for this reason we think the court should at least have given
consideration to the amount of money it was shown without
dispute to have been earned by the plaintiff in other employment. It is further stated in the citation of American
Jurisprudence, supra :
"It is a well settled principle that upon the
breach of a contract of employment calling for personal services by the wrongful discharge of the employe, the latter is required to use reasonable efforts
to obtain other employment of like nature for the
purpose of lessening or minimizing the damages. In
short, in an action by a wrongfully discharged employe by reason of the breach of his contract of employment, the defendant employer may reduce the
amount of damages recoverable by whatever the
plaintiff has earned or by reasonable diligence could
have earned in other employment subsequent to his
discharge.''
(b) and (c) At the request of plaintiff's counsel the
defendant furnished to the plaintiff a tabulation showing
the number of days plaintiff could have worked between
the 27th day of January, 1946 and the date of trial, had he
so desired, and stipulated as to the rate of pay he would have
received, there having been three increases of pay on the job
plaintiff would have held during such period of time. In
so stipulating, however, we specifically indicated that we
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would not admit that plaintiff would have worked every
day (365 days a year) during such period of time, and although there was no evidence that he would have done so
the court in fixing the damages and allowing him the sum of'
$18,892.76, assumed that he would. We offered to prove
what the plaintiff's earnings were between the years 1941
and 1945 and to prove that during such period of time he
only worked a portion of the time, although he would have
been able to work steadily (Tr. 35, 36). For this purpose we
offered as a witness the defendant's head timekeeper, Mr.
D. B. Porter, and the company's books. The court sustained
objections to this evidence and rejected our offer of proof.
When asked what significance this evidence had and what
we claimed therefor, we stated to the court:

MR. BRONSON: "I should think your Honor
would want to know what the probability would be
following August 1945, the date of dismissal, of his
working 7 days. a week, 30 or 31 days. a month
* * * which is what they are endeavoring to get
your Honor to hold. I think it is proper for you, the
Court, to draw inferences from the fact that he
only worked half the time ·for four years and he
would not work 7 days a week for the past five
years. In conclusion, the next thing I propose to
show was the exact days he was off. I make the offer
of proof at this time and your Honor can rule on it."
(Tr. 36).
We reassert the above and we contend t;hat it was a
proper matter for the court to take into consideration; that
the court had no right to ignore such evidence and make an
assumption, not based on any evidence, that the plaintiff
would have worked every single day for a period of five
years following his dismissal.
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The contract (Plaintiff's Ex. "E") provided in Article
VIII, Section 38 :
"In case dismissal is found to be unjust, yardman shall be reinstated and paid for all time lost
* * *"
.

-
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::::

~-

_

·

~

-~

Under no circumstances, even in a hearing before the
National Railroad Adjustment Board, would the plaintiff
be entitled to "all time lost" unless he was "reinstated." I
expect that it will be argued that the trial court thought
from the evidence that the plaintiff should be reinstated and
that the court refrained from reinstating the plaintiff
solely because under the Slocum case, supra, it was without
jurisdiction to make such an order; that because the court
thought that the plaintiff should be reinstated he was entitled to "all time lost." But the Slocum case definitely did
not hold that courts have full jurisdiction in suits involving
railway collective bargaining agreements except to· reinstate
an employe. The case holds that courts have no jurisdiction
other than to try a simple common-law action for damages
for breach of contract; that they cannot interpret the contract; that they cannot pass on the question of whether or not
an employe is entitled to reinstatement, or to any other
benefits under the contract. They have jurisdiction to decide ( 1) was the contract breached, ( 2) if so, the damages
if any, and nothing else. And they have absolutely no right
to apply any other principles in assessing damages than
those that have always been recognized in courts of law in
simple contract actions.

·;~

-',

In Eubanks v. Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. Co., (Texas)
59 S. W. 2d 825, in which a brakeman brought suit for
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damages for an alleged breach by the defendant carrier of
a collective bargaining agreement which provided that
where the employe was. unjustly discharged he should be
paid "for all time lost," the court said:
"The contract provides that, if the employee
is unjustly discharged, he shall have pay 'for all
time lost.' The trial court seems to hold that this
provision was intended to set aside the common-law
rule as to the measure of damages for breach of this
contract and substitute a different measure fixed by
the contract itself. The trial court then seems to
hold that the measure fixed by the contract would
not charge Eubanks. with money actually earned
during the time between his discharge and the j udgment, and would not obligate him in any way to
mitigate his damages by making a reasonable effort to secure other employment. The Court of Civil
Appeals holds, in effect, that the provision in the
contract requiring the railway company to pay him
'for all time lost' means nothing more than to obligate the railway company to pay for the loss of
earnings. In other words, we understand the opinion
of the Court of Civil Appeals to hold that the common-law rule should be applied in measurifng the
damages. We approve this holding."

The provisions of the contract under discussion cannot,
in our opinion, be considered a stipulation for liquidated
damages for the reason that it is inextricably connected
with reinstatement, and the payment for "all time lost" is
predicated upon and can only be ordered upon reinstate·
ment. The Board itself frequently orders reinstatement
without ordering the carrier to pay the employe for "time
lost." It is therefore not considered as a stipulation for
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liquidated damages in case of breach even by the Board
itself. What the plaintiff's dam~ges were, if any he had,
we do not know. There was no evidence on the matter and
it is impossible for this court or anyone else to ascertain
from the record in this case whether plaintiff was damaged
by his discharge or not. So far as the record shows he
may have earned in excess of what he would have earned
had he continued to be employed by the defendant. It was
plaintiff's burden to prove his damages, not the defendant's.
We submit that there was an utter failure of proof of
damages on the part of the plaintiff and that it was reversible error for the trial court to assess damages against
the defendant in any amount, and certainly reversible error
to assess damages in the manner the court did.

POINT V.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING
TO ALLOW THE DEFENDANT TO PROVE
THAT IT WAS POWERLESS TO REINSTAT·E
THE PL..L\.INTIFF
.
IN HIS EMPLOYMENT
AFTER THE EXPIRATION O·F SIX MONTH·S.
FROM THE DATE OF DISMISSAL WITHOUT
THE CONSENT. OF THE BROTHER.HOOD OF
·RAILROAD TRAINMEN, AND IN EXCLUDING
DEFENDANT'S PROFFER OF EVIDENCE TO
SHOW THAT THE BROTHERHOOD OF RAILROAD TRAINMEN WAS NEVER AT ANY
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TIME WILLING TO CONSENT TO PLAINTIFF'S REINSTATEMENT BY THE DEFENDANT.
In connection with this assignment of error Article
VIII, Section 38, of the agreement provides:
"Reinstatement will not be permitted after the
expiration of six months from date of dismissal, unless agreeable to the management and the general
committee, except that a case pending with either
the B.R. T. or O.R.C. at the expiration of the six
month period, will not be prejudiced. Where the
yardman involved has been out of service six months
or less it will not be obligatory to consult the committees representing these classes of employes in
considering the case for reinstatement."
The six months period following Rus.sell's dismissal
expired February 3, 1946. The fact that the agreement
provides that before the expiration of six months "it shall
not be obligatory" to consult the union, clearly indicates the
intention of the parties that it is obligatory to have the
union's consent after six months, unless the employe's case
is then pending with the "General Committee." At the expiration of six months there was. nothing pending with the
defendant company from the BRT or ORC. On January 22,
1946 Mr. Edens wrote to Mr. Hudgens, Local Chairman of
the Switchmen in Ogden, declining to reinstate the plaintiff. There the matter rested until February 15, 1946, when
Mr. C. E. McDaniels, of the Switchmen's Union, not of the
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, made another applica·
tion for reinstatement. Mr. Edens testified that the defendant had not at any time received any application or peti-
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tion from the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen to reinstate or to reconsider Mr. Russell's dismissal (Tr. 41).
That no application before the expiration of the six months
period \Yas ever made by anyone other than Mr. Hudgens,
Local Chairman of the Switchmen (Tr. 42). There was thus
no case pending with the BofRT or ORC at the expiration of
six months following dismissal. Therefore, without the
consent of the "General Committee," which we offered to
prove was the General Committee of the Brotherhood of
Railroad Trainmen, the sole bargaining agent for yardmen,
but were precluded from so doing, the defendant could not
have reinstated the plaintiff had it desired to do so. We
offered to prove, and again were prohibited from doing so,
that there never was a time either before or after the expiration of six months following dismissal when the "General Committee" was willing to consent to the defendant
reinstating this employe.
Mr. H. C. Beckett was called by the defendant and
testified that he was the Local Chairman or Local Representative of the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen in Ogden,
and had been for some 15 years (Tr. 43). That he was
familiar with the contract which is involved in this suit
(Tr. 44), and, in fact, it appears that he signed the same
on behalf of the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen when
it was negotiated and entered into with the defendant company. He testified that the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen was the sole and exclusive bargaining agency for the
men working in the Ogden Yard and handled their grievances (Tr. 44, 45). He testified that neither Mr. Russell in
· · · person, or by or through anyone else, ever requested the
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BofRT to petition the defendant company for reinstatement
(Tr. 45, 46). We then offered to prove a vital and essential
matter in support of this affirmative defense, to-wit, that
the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen never were at any
time agreeable to having the defendant reinstate the plaintiff, to which the court sustained plaintiff's objection (Tr.
47). We also offered to prove that the BofRT up to and
including the date of trial were unwilling to consent to the
defendant reinstating the plaintiff and this offer of proof
was rejected (Tr. 46).
Ther~ being nothing pending from the BofRT or the
ORC at the expiration of six months. following plaintiff's
dismissal, and the General Committee of the BofRT not
being willing to consent to plaintiff's reinstatement after the
six months period, the defendant could not have reinstated
the plaintiff, had it desired, without breaching the contract
as to each and every yardman employe in the Ogden Yards
who would be set down one place on the seniority roster by
reason of such reinstatement. It would have given rise to a
cause of action for damages against defendant by each and
every one of such yardmen employes. The plaintiff is
bound by this provision of the contract; it is binding on the
carrier, and it exists for the benefit of all the employes
covered by the agreement. The plaintiff has. only such
rights as are given to him by the contract in question, which
was negotiated by the BofRT, sole bargaining agent for all
yardmen. The plaintiff is bound to proceed in securing his
rights· under this contract in accordance with the procedure
agreed upon therefor by the carrier and the bargaining
agency. To have reinstated the plaintiff in the face of opposition :tJy the BofRT might easily have precipitated a
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strike-one of the main evils the Railway Labor Act and
collective bargaining agreements in the railroad industry
are designed to prevent. Nothing is more zealously guarded
by employes than their seniority, and rightly so. Reduction
in seniority means a loss of earnings, less agreeable work,
less favorable working shifts, and danger of being cut off
upon a reduction of forces. It is easy to understand why
not even the Union wanted Russell reinstated. Employes
quite naturally resent one who secures unto himself all the
benefits of a collective bargaining agreement, prejudicing
the other employes on the property by standing in the way
of their advancement on the seniority roster, when it is
done by one who will not protect his job, works. only part
time, and engages in some profitable outside business or employment. Russell clung tenaciously to a job in the railroad
industry during the war years by working only part time.
He retained his seniority and built it up in an industry that
was crying for men to work to keep military supplies moving to the west coast, and in an industry whose employes
were exempt from military service so that they might help
maintain the transportation system so essential to winning
the war. We were prepared to show that the plaintiff, instead of protecting his job, engaged in the profitable business of selling a scarce commodity and one in great demand
at that time, to-wit, beer, in a community that was congested with military personnel and war-industry workers.
It was for such reasons that the BofRT would not consent
to plaintiff's reinstatement, as they had a right to, and not
because (as we expect will be claimed) the plaintiff was not
a member of the Trainmen's Union, but of the Switchmen's

Union.
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We submit that in refusing to reinstate the plaintiff
when his case was not pending with either the BofRT or
the ORC at the expiration of six months following dismissal,
and when the General Committee of the BofRT was unwilling after the expiration of six months to consent to defendant reinstating plaintiff, that the defendant was maintai11r
ing the imtegrity of the agreement it had with its employes
rather than breaching the same, and on this affirmative defense alone the defendant was entitled to a judgment of no
cause of action at the hands of the court. We submit that
the showing made on this point warrants this, court in remanding the case with instructions to enter a judgment of
no cause of action in favor of the defendant.

POINT VI.
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT FAILED TO FIND
THAT THE PLAINTIFF WAS WITHOUT ANY
RIGHT TO MAINTAIN AN ACTION FOR
DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF THE CO~
TRACT, OR IF SUCH RIGHT AT ANY TIME
DID EXIST, IN FAILING TO FIND THAT
PLAINTIFF WAS FORE·CLOSED AND ESTOPPED FROM ASSERTING THE SAME.
Attached to plaintiff's application of January 14, 1946
for reinstatement, filed in his behalf by J. B. Hudgens,
Local Chairman of the Switchmen, is Russell's written
signed authorization to the SUNA to represent him in
handling his grievance with the defendant company (Plain·
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tiff's Ex. "B"). This authority is likewise attached to the
letter of C. E. lVIcDaniels, Acting Vice President of the
SUNA, dated February 15, 1946, asking reinstatement and
addressed to Mr. F. C. Paulsen, Vice President of the defendant company (Plaintiff's Ex. "D"). This "designation"
or "authorization" by the plaintiff of the SUN A was admitted by plaintiff (Tr. 4, 5). It is as broad and extensive
as can be imagined, the plaintiff giving the SUNA full
authority to represent him in any way they saw fit and
consenting to be bound by their disposition of the case. It
was a commitment made by the plaintiff to the defendant
company that it might deal with any officer or representative of the SUNA the same as though they were dealing with
the plaintiff in person; it was a commitment made to the
defendant that the plaintiff would be bound by any disposition of this case that might be made by an officer or representative of the SUNA, or agreed upon by such officer and
the defendant company. This communication, addressed to
the defendant, says :
"I, the undersigned, hereby authorize the
Switchmen's Union of North America and any and
all of its officers and representatives to represent
and act in my * * * place and stead, as. my
* * * agent and representative in the prosecution of grievance claim, reading : (statement of the
claim) against The Ogden Union Railway and Depot Company, and I * * * authorize the Switchmen's Union of North America and any and all of
its officers and representatives to represent and act
as my * * * agent and representative in my
* * * place and stead, in all further prosecution
of the afore quoted grievance, * * * and I authorize and empower the Switchmen's Union of North
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America and any and all of its officers and representatives to negotiate, adjust and dispose of the
herein quoted grievance claim in any manner

* * *
(Sgd.) W. B. Russell."
This is perhaps as good a place as any to point out
that the substance of the rambling, erroneous, and at times
incomprehensible presentation by Hudgens in his application for reinstatement of January 14, 1946, and by McDaniels in his application for reinstatement of February 15,
1946, is of no assistance or consequence in the disposition
of this case. The only significance of these two "submissions" or letters is that it is shown thereby that the SUNA,
through Local Chairman Hudgens and later through Acting
Vice President McDaniels, were representing the plaintiff
pursuant to their authorization by the plaintiff.
We desire at this point to invite the court's. attention
to the defendant's Exhibit "3", a letter written by plaintiff's duly authorized representative, C. E. McDaniels, to
the vice president of the defendant company, dated May
14, 1946. We also want to point out that this letter was the
final and last communication passing between the parties
from the time it was delivered until several years. later
when plaintiff filed the present suit. A careful examination
of this letter (Defendant's Ex. "3"), reveals. in the second
paragraph thereof that Mr. McDaniels and Mr. Paulsen
during negotiations had been in conference over the case
and that Mr. McDaniels had agreed to conduct an examination into the defendant's charge that Russell did not tell
the truth at the investigation which resulted in his dismissal. McDaniels then states in the next and last para-
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graph of this letter that the "investigation has been completed" and ··'We are withdra~ving the grievance and the
case is closed." Is there any doubt that the investigation
disclosed that Russell did not tell the truth at the investigation? Is there any doubt that this is an admission by Russell
that he falsified at the investigation? Is there any doubt
that the case was at this point finally and conclusively disposed of, by the plaintiff's stipulation that he had no valid
claim against the defendant, by his advice to the defendant
that he was "withdrawing the grievance," and that the "case
was closed," in view of the full and complete authority McDaniels had from the plaintiff Russell ''to negotiate, adjust
and dispose of the grievance in any manner''? This was the
plaintiff speaking and it is as though he spoke to the defendant in these words, "I did not tell you the truth at the
investigation. The charge made against me was true and
I now admit it. I withdraw the claim I have made against
you and you may consider the matter closed."

There can be no claim made here that this was not binding on the plaintiff. He had never revoked the authority
of McDaniels, although he had the right to do so at any
time. He did not take the stand at the trial and did not call
McDaniels to repudiate, explain or modify the clear meaning
of this letter in any way. It cannot be said that because
McDaniels in his letter also said that the withdrawal was
....... "without preJudice to our contentions and position as ex,...... pressed in our letter of February 15, 1946, and without
.. establishing a precedent as to adjustment of future griev.. ances possessing dissimilar facts," that such statement was
, a limitation of any kind, or a reservation of a right in the
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plaintiff to sue the defendant company years later. Mr.
McDaniels as the Acting Vice President of the Switchmen's
Union of North America is. accustomed to negotiating with
management in labor relations cases. He obviously is saying
in the above quoted portion of his letter that he is. notrelinquishing the "princi pies" contended for in his application for reinstatement dated February 15, 1946, as applied
in a proper case ; that he does not want his admission of
the invalidity of Russell's claim to prejudice "the adjustment of future grievances possessing dissimilar facts and
circumstances.''
There is no ambiguity or equivocation in McDaniels'
letter, and defendant's treatment of the -case as closed and
finally terminated was fully warranted. And after receipt
of this notice that the grievance was withdrawn and the
case closed, the defendant, according to the testimony of Mr.
Edens, its Superintendent, had always treated it as a closed
issue (Tr. 42, 43).
We pleaded the affirmative defense of estoppel against
plaintiff to maintain this action five years after the above
representations were made and to recover as damages "lost
time" for five years, or, for that matter, to maintain any
action at any time after defendant received the ·notice of
withdrawal of the grievance. That the notice to defendant
that it could treat the case as closed, and the defendant
thereupon closing the case, operated to defendant's detri·
ment if plaintiff )s now permitted to maintain this. action,
we have not the slightest hesitancy in asserting. Up to the
very moment the notice of withdrawal was received the
matter was. an open issue with the defendant and considera·
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tion was being given thereto, evidenced by exchanges of
correspondence and personal conferences. Vice President
Paulsen of the defendant company had not rejected plaintiff's claim and he had the undisputed authority to allow
it in \Vhole or in part, or make any disposition thereof he
deemed proper. Had the plaintiff himself not terminated
all consideration of his case the mangement might have
as frequently happens in these cases, ordered the reinstatement of plaintiff "on a leniency basis" on "probation,"
plaintiff might have been returned to work without loss of
seniority rights, or he might have been given a new seniority date. He might have been given some back pay or he
might have been returned to work without any allowance
for time lost. True, his claim might have been rejected
entirely, but it is not what might have been the ultimate disposition of the claim that determines whether or not defendant incurs a detriment if plaintiff is allowed to maintain
this suit. The detriment lies in the fact that the plaintiff
caused the defendant by his representat~ons to cease weighing and considering the disposition of the claim, treating the
matter as closed and not as an outstanding claim with, as it
must always be considered, the possibility of ultimate liability. Had the consideration by the defendant continued and
resulted in total rejection of the claim, either party might
have taken the matter for final determination to the Railroad Adjustment Board. The Railway Labor Act, Section
3, First (i)., 45 U. S. C. A., Section 153, page 1022, provides
that the carrier and employe failing to reach an adjustment
by negotiation,
"The dispute may be referred by petition of the
parties or either party to the appropriate division of
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the Adjustment Board with a full statement of the
facts, and all data bearing upon the dispute."

In Order of Railway Conductors v. Southern Railway
Co,. 339 U. S. 255, 94 L. Ed. 542, 70 S. Ct. 585, cited supra,
where negotiations between the railroad and union failed
to bring about an agreement and the railroad had brought
suit in the state court, the union filed a petition for a hearing and award before the Adjustment Board. The Supreme
Court of the United States reversed the holding of the state
court for the reason that the court did not have jurisdiction. We cite this case again at this point in support of the
proposition that the defendant in this case had the opportunity to progress its controversy with Russell to a final conclusion by submitting the matter to the Adjustment Board.
The Supreme Court of the United States said:
"Sustaining the court's action (in assuming
jurisdiction) would invite races of diligence whenever a carrier or union preferred one forum to the
other. And if a carrier or a union could choose a
court instead of the Board the other party would be
deprived of the privilege conferred by Section 3
First (i) of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U. S. C. A.
Section 153 First ( i) , which provides that after

negotiations have failed 'either party' may refer the
dispute to the appropriate division of the Adjustment
Board."
We do not have to show that had the negotiations not
been terminated by the plaintiff and resulted in refusal by
the defendant to reinstate, that such action by the defendant
would have been approved· by the Railroad Adjustment
Board, in order to show that the defendant suffers a detriment by such termination of negotiations by the plaintiff.
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It would, of course, be impossible to show what disposition
the Adjustment Board would make of the case in such an
event, but the defendant had the right, that is, the opportunity to proceed to bring to a final conclusion the determination of a claimed liability with reasonable dispatch, and of
that right it is deprived, to its detriment, if this suit after so
long a lapse of time can now be maintained. The company
justifiably considered the matter terminated in its favor.
So long as there was any possibility that the company would
ultimately have to return the plaintiff to work with pay
for "lost time," the company would have or could have
pushed the matter to a final conclusion to shorten the time
they might have to pay wages to plaintiff without receiving services from him. Knowing that there was a possibility in a controversy of this kind that they would have to
pay the employe wages for "lost time" if they ultimately
failed to have the dismissal sustained, can anyone believe
the defendant company would have let the matter rest for
five years, risking the possibility of heavy damages if they
finally lost the case? It was because of the plaintiff's advising defendant that he was withdrawing his grievance,
that the case was "closed," that the defendant remained inactive for so long, to its serious detriment, if this court
says this case may now be maintained. But we reiterate that
it is not what the ultimate outcome would have been had
plaintiff not terminated the case that determines "detriment," and it is not what course defendant would have pursued, but for such termination, that determines "detriment." Those matters are not known and cannot in the
nature of things in such a case as this ever be made known,
but the opportunity for the defendant to bring the case to
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a successful conclusion or to reduce its damage, if not
successful, by expediting its disposal was there, and it was
there until destroyed by the plaintiff's advice to the defendant to close the case.
In Restatement of the Law, Contracts, Section 90, page
110, the legal principle here involved is set forth as follows:

"A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forebearance of a
definite and substantial character on the part of the
promisee and which does induce such action or forebearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only
by enforcement of the promise."
Injustice in this case, it seems to us, can be avoided only
by requiring the plaintiff to retain the position he took when
he advised the defendant that his grievance was withdrawn
and that it could consider the controversy terminated.
A statement of the rule is contained in the case of
I. X. L. Stores Co. v. Suc·cess Markets, 98 Utah 124, 97 P.
2d 577, in which this court said:

"The estoppel here relied upon is known as an
·equitable estoppel or estoppel in pais. The law upon
the subject is well settled. The vital principle is that
he who, by his language or conduct, leads another to
do what he would not otherwise have done, shall not
subject such person to loss or injury by disappoint·
irng the expectat~ons upon which he acted. Such a
change of position is sternly forbidden. This remedy
has always applied so as to promote the ends of
justice. It is available only for protection and can·
not be used as a weapon of assault."
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In "'"illiston on Contracts, Revised Edition, Volume I,
page 494, Section 139, it is said:
"It is generally true that one who has led
another to act in reasonable reliance on his representations of fact cannot afterwards in litigation
between the two deny the truth of the representaions * * * "
Professor Williston, Volume I, Revised Edition, Section
140, page 503, after quoting the rule from Restatement of
Contracts, as above set forth, says :
"It is not to be denied that there are numerous
cases in which this element of justifiable reliance to
one's detriment is held not sufficient to make a
gratuitous promise binding. Therefore, Section 90
(quoted above) does not assert a sweeping rule that
in every case action in reliance is sufficient support
for a promise."
We are not certain that the factual situation in the
case before the court involves a promise without assent or
consideration. It seems to us that the forebearance on
the part of the defendant to progress its dispute with the
plaintiff Russell, in view of his representation that defendant might treat the case as "closed," might well constitute
consideration. If, however, that is not the case, the situation then falls within that well recognized principle of the
law wherein estoppel is recognized as a substitute for consideration. Probably there is no distinction, but merely a
different rationale applied to the same problem. At any
rate, it seems to us to clearly fall within the aforequoted pro-
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vision from the Restatement of Contracts and the discussion
thereof by Professor Williston. Continuing, he says:
"In the first place it is only where the action
induced is definite and substantial that any legal
consequences follow from the gratuitous promise. In
the second place, such an action should reasonably
have been expected by the promisor. Under these
words it will not be enough that some action of the
promisee even of substantial character has been induced by the promise. A promise of one thousand
dollars with which to buy a motor car may thus be
binding if it induced the purchase of the car. A
promise of one thousand dollars for no specified
purpose will not be binding, though it induces similar
action. If the promisee is helpless to do otherwise,
he has not acted or foreborne in reliance on the
promise within this doctrine.
"Finally the words are added at the end of the
section for greater caution 'if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.' With these
qualifications it is believed that the provisions of
Section 90 (the Restatement) do not go beyond the
existing law, in many jurisdictions at least, and that
the section is a useful coordination of the classes of
cases enumerated in the preceding section."
That the action induced in the present case was "definite and substantial" should be apparent from the fact that
it results in a very large judgment against defendant, if the
plaintiff is now allowed to repudiate. Was defendant's
action "reasonably" to be expected by the plaintiff Russell?
What action on defendant's part other than treating the
controversy "closed" and terminated could be expected
when he advised the defendant in effect that the charge
made against him was true, that he falsified, that he was

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

69

withdrawing his grievance, and that the defendant could
consider the matter "closed"'? The promisee, the defendant, was not helpless to do otherwise than it did. It might
have, before negotiations were concluded, reinstated the
plaintiff on some basis as frequently happens in such cases.
It could have progressed this pending case, which had a
potential liability, as all such controversies have, to final
conclusion and with dispatch and avoided an accumulation
of over $18,000.00 damages, except for the representations
of the plaintiff himself. And finally, we believe the facts
are such that "injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise." We would like to observe parenthetically that the word "promise" is obviously used in the Restatement in a broad sense and it is readily apparent that
it covers any kind of representation by words or conduct.
We believe that this case now before the court fulfills
the requirements of the law as set out in the Restatement
and the carefully detailed analysis. thereof by Professor
Williston. It is true that the earlier cases did not look with
favor upon estoppel as a defense. The modern view is to
consider the application of the doctrine of estoppel, particularly the kind we are dealing with here, as comporting with
the very highest sense of equity and pure justice.
We submit that the plaintiff should be estopped to
maintain this action, in view of his conduct and representations in leading the defendant to believe that the case was
disposed of, and the defendant's reliance thereon to its
detriment. We earnestly say to this court that on this assignment of error alone the case should be remanded to the
District Court with instructions to enter judgment against
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

70
the plaintiff and in favor of the defendant of no cause of
action. This disposition seems particularly appropriate in
view of the plaintiff's admission that he falsified at the investigation-his admission that he was guilty of the charge
upon which his dismissal was based and which is the whole
basis for this suit.

POINT VII.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ENTERING
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW WHOLLY UNSUPPORTED BY COMPETENT EVIDENCE IN THE ,CASE, AND IN
ENTERING ITS JUDGMENT UPON SUCH
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS.
In order to a void prolonging this brief we will endeavor
to treat this assignment of error as briefly as possible.
What we have heretofore said herein addresses itself pertinently to this assignment and should make it clear that the
findings of fact (R. 51), and conclusions of law (R. 61), are
unsupported by the evidence, and the judgment (R. 63) is
based upon erroneous findings.
The original judgment signed by the court gave to the
plaintiff as damages the sum of $23,001.92, which was $4,000.00 more than the plaintiff was entitled to, figured in
accordance with the court's theory, and was in excess of
$8,000.00 over the amount demanded in the complaint (R.
34) . We filed a motion to correct the judgment, to amend
the findings of fact and conclusions of law, asking the court
pursuant to the new rules of procedure to enter judgment in
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favor of the defendant of ''no cause of action'' (R. 48),
and also filed a motion for a new trial ( R. 37).
The plaintiff filed objections to our motion to amend
the findings of fact and conclusions of law and to correct
the judgment, submitted a new set of findings of fact and
conclusions of la,,· and judgment to the court. The court
disposed of the defendant's motion to correct the findings
of fact, conclusions of law and judgment, and motion for a
new trial, by signing and having entered the amended findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment submitted by
plaintiff's counsel (R. 54). Although it was not necessary
under the new rules of practice and procedure for us to
move the court to correct its findings and conclusions, in
order to raise the matter on appeal, we considered _it was
our duo/ to the trial court to fully present our views on the
law and the evidence, which we did in oral argument almost
in as much detail as set forth in this brief. When, however, the court signed another set of findings of fact and
conclusions of law and judgment, which were substantially
the same as the first set of findings, conclusions, and j udgment signed, we considered we had discharged our responsibility as counsel to the court and took this appeal.
Without rearguing the matter, we submit that the evidence was wholly insufficient to warrant the court in finding, as it did, that during the entire ten day period, which
was the period covered by the investigation, and up to and
including the date of the hearing, the plaintiff was ill and
under the care of Dr. Stratford (R. 58) ; that plaintiff's
absence without leave in excess of ten days "was not intentional or willful" (R. 58) ; that "the defendant wilfully and
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arbitrarily discharged the plaintiff" (R. 59) ; that "on the
14th day of May, 1946, the said C. E. McDaniels withdrew
as plaintiff's representative" (R. 59) ; and that "the plaintiff duly performed all things on his part required by the
contract as conditions to his reinstatement" (R. 61).
As to the ·conclusions of law, we think there is no basis
for concluding that Rule 55 (b) , which the plaintiff was
charged with violating, "has no application to the facts
surrounding plaintiff's absence"; that "plaintiff's rights
to recover from the defendant by reason of defendant's
wrongful discharge of plaintiff became fixed as of the
22nd day of January, 1946"; that "plaintiff is not estopped
from asserting his claim against the defendant" ; that "the
defendant is not entitled to offset against time lost by plaintiff, by reason of its wrongful discharge of the plaintiff,
other earnings of plaintiff during such period"; and that
the plaintiff is entitled to recover $18,892.76 from the defendant (R. 61, 62).
The judgment in this case is based upon findings and
conclusions that are not supported ·by the evidence and
we submit that the evidence is such that this court cannot
remand the case with instructions to correct the findings
and conclusions so as to support the judgment. We submit
this assignment of error on the argument made in connection with the preceding points discussed.

It seems to us that throughout the progress of this case
the court construed the contract strictly against the defendant in every particular where the plaintiff claimed a right,
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~ and indulged the 'videst liberality in favor of the plaintiff

· ·wherever the defendant sought to assert some right under
: the contract. The plaintiff soug~ht to hold the defendant
. to strict accountability and sought successfully the utmost
. indulgence for himself. We think both parties are entitled
. to the same treatment. This contract is not one drawn by
: the defendant company so as to warrant such a method of
_ interpretation and application. It is well known that this
: type of contract is invariably the result of days and some:: times weeks of negotiations between the company and the
union with a considerable number of men from each side
::participating. Each side brings to the conference room long
: experience in the labor relations problems of the industry.
~- Both sides understand all phases of the subject matter, they
:_know what they want, they do not sign until they have each
secured the best terms they think possible, and when they
- do sign they know what their respective rights and duties
are under the contract. They deal at arm's length and it
~ cannot truthfully be said that either side has the other at
-: a noticeable disadvantage in negotiating. Therein lies the
_ success of the collective bargaining idea in American in-.- dustry. The contract in subsequent disputes should be con--_ strued and applied the same as to both parties and with
. _fairness and impartiality.
If we have not been helpful to the court by multiplying
citations to adjudicated cases it is not because we have not
made the effort. There have been relatively few cases of
this type before the courts. and this explains the limited
::: number of authorities which can be found close enough to
~; the facts or the legal principles involved as to be worthy
-~ of citation. Controversies such as. this one, as was most
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plainly indicated by the Supreme 'Court of the United States,
do not belong in the courts, nor have they, except in relatively few instances, been submitted to the courts. An examination of the reports of the awards of the National Railroad Adjustment Board discloses that they are disposing
of approximately 1500 cases a year arising under collective
bargaining agreements. entered. into pursuant to the Railway Labor Act.
We respectfully submit that this case should be remanded to the District Court with instructions to enter
judgment in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff of "no cause of action", such dis·position being amply
warranted under either Point V or Point VI. We further
submit that the trial court committed reversible error in
admitting the transcript of the proceedings at the official
investigation as substantive evidence, in denying the defendant's motion for a judgment of nonsuit, in refusing to
admit evidence offered by the defendant to show justification for plaintiff's dismissal, in assessing damages in the
manner it did, and that these errors individually, and certainly collectively, warrant the court in at least reversing
the judgment and remanding the case for a new trial.
Respectfully submitted,
BRYAN P. LEVERICH,
M. J. BRONSON,
A. U. MINER,
HOWARD F. CORAY,
D. A. ALSUP,
Counsel for
Defendant and Appellant

10 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah
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